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FOREWORD 
Agriculture, the most important sector of Pakistan's economy, has 
been receiving special attention during the past several years. Capital 
inputs are being increasingly used on the farm. Since the pace of the use 
of capital inputs, so essential for agricultural modernization, depends 
heavily upon the prices which the farmer has to pay, a study of the pricing 
mechanism of the capital inputs assumes considerable importance. 
This monograph of the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics 
(PIDE) has attempted to study in depth the prices of three major capital 
inputs, viz., fertilizers, tractors and tubewells, at each level of the market-
ing system. In some cases, problem areas are explored and alternative 
approaches suggested. 
It is hoped that some of the implications of the policies discussed in 
this monograph within the framework of broad policy areas will prove 
useful in designing programmes for agricultural development in Pakistan. 
The study may also help identify some of the problems and areas which 
should be given high priority in future agricultural research. 
The study was carried out by a joint team of six agricultural econo-
mists drawn from the PIDE and the U. S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA). Mr. Mohammad Afzal, Research Economist at the PIDE, was 
the leader of the team. The other PIDE economists engaged in this 
study were Mr. Rauf Azhar and Mr. Mohammad Ahsan. The USDA 
economists were Messrs. Dana G. Dalrymple, Lyle P. Schertz and 
James R. Sayre who were supported by the U. S. Agency for International 
Development (US AID). 
The study was completed in December, 1973. Since then, it must 
be pointed out here, the prices of fertilizers and petroleum in international 
trade have gone up dramatically. 
The views expressed in this monograph are solely of the authors and 
do not necessarily reflect the official thinking of either the PIDE or the 
USDA. 
M . L . QURESHI 
Director 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics 
Islamabad 
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Introduction 
Capital inputs have become increasingly important in the expansion 
of agricultural production in developing countries. Economists normally 
classify capital goods as fixed or working capital. Fixed capital contri-
butes to the production process but is not immediately used up in that 
process. Thus, the term is generally used with reference to hardware 
items such as tractors, trucks, and pump sets. Working capital includes 
such goods as fertilizers which are consumed in the production process. 
While the importance of capital goods is widely recognized, and their 
effects extensively studied, not much is generally known as to how they 
are priced or what the price levels are at various points in the marketing 
process. 
In order to study the prices and the pricing process of three main 
capital goods in agriculture, viz., fertilizers, tractors and tubewells, it was 
decided to conduct, a preliminary field survey wherein farmers as well 
as firms and agencies involved in the import, production and distribution 
of the three capital goods were interviewed with the help of specially 
prepared questionnaire. The interviews were carried out in November and 
early in December, 1973 in Peshawar, Islamabad, Lyallpur, Lahore, 
Karachi, Hyderabad, and Quetta areas, thereby covering all major regions 
of Pakistan. 
The limited number of principals interviewed were concerned with 
the import, production and wholesale distribution of the three capital 
goods. It is possible to contact nearly all the key groups involved, the 
only exception being that of tubewell manufacturers. The degree of 
coverage dropped very sharply at the retailer and farmer stage because 
of the vast numbers involved. 
The three capital goods studied involve somewhat different production 
and pricing processes. Fertilizer is manufactured domestically as well as 
imported. The marketing margins and the retail prices are set by the 
Central Government. Tractors are at present imported but there are 
plans for domestic assembly. Trading margins and prices of tractors 
are also controlled by the Central Government. Tubewells are manu-
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factured in Pakistan from imported raw materials and components. 
While the Central Government does not fix margins or retail prices, it 
does influence them through its regulation and distribution of raw material 
inputs. Thus, one could say that the results of the survey basically reflect 
administered pricing. However, it may be pointed out that the prices 
actually paid by the farmers are often in excess of those fixed by the 
Government. 
The three capital inputs have been discussed in three separate chapters 
and received identical treatment consisting of a review of the structure of 
distribution, an examination of costs and prices, and, finally, a review of 
problems and issues. Since prices are affected by the institutional structure, 
a certain amount of overlap is involved. Some of the policy discussions 
deal as much with structure as with price. A closing chapter attempts to 
cast some of the major findings of the study in a more general policy 
framework. 
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Chapter I 
PRICING AND DISTRIBUTION OF FERTILIZERS 
This section briefly reviews the pricing and distribution of fertilizer 
in Pakistan as of November 1973. It attempts to provide an introduction 
to the subject and suggest important policy areas requiring further study. 
Structure of the Fertilizer iudustiy 
The structure of Pakistan's fertilizer industry is fairly complex, involving 
not only Central and Provincial Governments but also Pakistani and 
American firms. Fertilizer is both produced in the country and imported. 
In discussing the structure of the fertilizer industry, we will trace its 
evolution, examine statistics of fertilizer supply and consumption, review 
the present distribution system, and briefly note the proposed fertilizer 
plant construction. 
Evolution1 
Fertilizers were first imported by Pakistan in 1952 and the first 
domestic production reached the market in 1957. Imports were made 
solely by the Central Government which then supplied the imported 
fertilizers to the Provincial Governments for distribution through Govern-
ment outlets. Domestic production was carried out in plants owned by 
the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) and was 
initially sold through commercial agents in mandi towns. 
In 1963-64, the Central Government decided to turn the distribution 
of fertilizer over to the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC),' 
with "basic democrats" at the village level acting as sub-agents. The 
arrangement with the "basic democrats" having proved unsatisfactory, 
the distribution of the domestically produced fertilizers was later entrusted 
to the Rural Supply Co-operative Corporation (RSCC). 
From 1963-64 to 1968, imports and distribution of imported fertilizers 
were the responsibility of the ADC while the production and distribution 
'Based on [2, pp. 9-10]. 
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of domestically produced fertilizers were the responsibility of the PIDC. 
Both the organizations sold fertilizers through their commission agents 
many of whom acted as agents to both the ADC and PIDC simultaneously. 
From January 1968 onwards, the ADC appointed a number of 
principal agents to carry out distribution while it itself concentrated on 
newer fertilizers or geographic areas where private distributors were not 
operating. The RSCC continued to be active in handling a large portion 
of the fertilizers produced by the PIDC factories. ESSO began fertilizer 
production in December 1968 and established its own distribution system. 
Other principal agents were private Pakistani firms the largest among 
which were Dawood Corporation Ltd., Jaffer Brothers Ltd., and Pakistan 
National Oils Ltd. (PNO). 
Each private firm had its own retail distributors, though some retail 
agents served more than one principal agent. The privately owned 
Dawood-Hercules (D.H.) Urea Plant began production in October 1971; 
distribution was initially handled by several private principal agents but 
subsequently was undertaken by the Dawood Corporation and the 
Government. 
On January 8, 1972, the ADC was dissolved and replaced by the 
Agricultural Supply Organization (ASO), which was charged with the 
responsibility of purchasing all imported fertilizers. Provincial counter-
parts were established in 1973 (e.g., the Sind Agricultural Supply Cor-
poration, or SASCO, and the Punjab Agricultural Supply Corporation, 
PASCO) which took over local distribution formerly handled by the 
ADC and the RSCC. 
On August 28, 1973, the Punjab Government provincialized the distri-
bution of fertilizers within the province. At that time the functions of 
the four private principal agents (Dawood, Esso, Jaffer, and PNO) and 
others were to be assumed by the Provincial Agricultural Supply Corpora-
tions (but the Directorate of Agriculture in Baluchistan). A month 
later, the Punjab Government modified the new policy and permitted half 
of the distribution of the Dawood-Hercules urea output to remain in 
private hands. The number of principal private agents, however, was 
reduced to two, viz., Dawood and Esso, the latter having confined its 
operation to the southern portion of the province. Fertilizer distribution 
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in Sind was not provincialized but was influenced in that Dawood, Jaffer, 
and PNO withdrew from Sind and Esso increased its distribution there. 
The distribution system in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) 
remained unchanged as of November 1973. 
Fertilizer Supply and Consumption Statistics 
Fertilizer statistics may be divided into two main groups; those 
concerning supply and those relating to consumption. Supply, in turn, is 
composed of domestic production and imports. 
Domestic Production 
Domestic fertilizer production is largely of the nitrogenous types and 
is based on domestic natural gas. Phosphatic fertilizer production is 
relatively limited and is currently based on imported raw materials. 
The major forms of the fertilizers produced in Pakistan are: 
Production of nitrogenous forms began in 1958 while that of the 
phosphatic forms began in 1957. Output has expanded considerably 
over the years, as shown in Table 1. 
Details of domestic production, as of November 1973, are given in 
Table 2. Production levels in some of the PIDC factories in earlier years 
were below these levels.1 
It is understood that Dawood-Hercules could increase their output 
by 15% if they could get more natural gas. This would be about 50,000 
metric tons a year, a significant expansion in terms of total produc-
tion. No plants were under construction in November 1973. One was 
scheduled to begin construction in January 1974 while negotiations were 
at an advanced stage on several others. (This matter will be discussed 
later in this section.) 
•For further details on the first five plants through 1968-69, see [2, pp. 152-163]. 
Ammonium Sulphate 
Ammonium Nitrate 
Single Superphosphate 
Urea (46% N) 
(21 % N ) 
(26% N) 
(18% P) 
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Table 11 
Domestic Fertilizer Production in Pakistan (1957 to 1972-73) 
(Metric Tons) 
Year 
Nutrient 
Nitrogenous 
Weight 
Phosphatic 
1957 188 
1958 ... 4,300 . . . 200 
1959 9,000 . . . 280 
1960 9,560 ... 710 
1960-61 . . . 9,902 . . . 1,618 
1961-62 . . . 13,906 . . . 1,442 
1962-63 ... 41,460 . . . 1,108 
1963-64 ... 45,269 . . . 1,205 
1964-65 . . . 48,141 ... . . . 1,467 
1965-66 . . . 47,132 . . . 1,438 
1966-67 . . . 51,961 . . . 724 
1967-68 . . . 50,204 . . . . . . 2,894 
1968-69 . . . 79,027 . . . 2,548 
1969-70 . . . 128,657 . . . 4,069 
1970-71 . . . 129,579 ... 4,583 
1971-72 . . . 215,070 ... ... 4,948 
1972-73 . . . 280,411 . . . 8,877 
Source: Chemical Consultants, Lahore. (Compiled from Government statistics.) 
Table 2 
Domestic Fertilizer Production in Pakistan, 1973 
Plant 
Owner Location Product 
Estimated Production 
(Metric Tons) 
PIDC 
Esso 
Dawood-
Hercules 
Daudkhel Ammonium Sulphate 
Multan Ammonium Nitrate 
Urea 
Lyallpur & Jaranawala Single Superphosphate 
Dharki 
Chichoki Malian 
Urea 
Urea 
91,000 
90,000 
45,000 
54,000 
175,000 
340,000 
Source: Interviews in Lahore and Karachi, November 1973. 
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Imports 
Fertilizer imports began in 1952. As in the case of domestic produc-
tion, emphasis has been placed on nitrogenous forms. Data of fertilizer 
imports during 1960-61 are summarized in Table 3. Imports of nitrogenous 
fertilizers reached their peak in 1969-70 while those of phosphatic types 
reached their highest point in 1972-73 although they are projected to go 
even higher in 1973-74. 
Table 3 
Imports of Fertilizers in Pakistan (1960-61 to 1972-73) 
(Nutrient Weight in Metric Tons) 
Year 
Type of 
Nitrogenous 
Fertilizer 
Phosphatic 
1960-61 . . . 20,699 2,556 
1961-62 . . . 20,759 — 
1962-63 ... 31,143 — 
1963-64 5,125 — 
1964-65 . . . 3,204 — 
1965-66 . . . 48,986 — 
1966-67 ... 106,397 16,391 
1967-68 . . . 103,331 49,316 
1968-69 ... 117,518 31,979 
1969-70 . . . 288,633 6,160 
1970-71 . . . 107,156 37,897 
1971-72 . . . 70,440 — 
1972-73 ... 120,597 70,152 
(1973-74) . . . ...(211,040)* (98,399)* 
Source: Chemical Consultants, Lahore, and Dawood Corporation, Lahore (for 1972-73 
and 1973-74). 
•Projections. 
Among the various types of fertilizers imported in Pakistan in 
recent years, urea (46% N) has been by far the most important while 
diammonium phosphate (DAP) (18% N and 46% P) has been second in 
importance. Other fertilizers have become Relatively less important. 
Breakdown of imported fertilizers by major types, for the last few years, is 
given in Table 4. In 1972-73, in terms of product weight, urea accounted 
for 54%, DAP 38% and others 8% of the total. 
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Table 11 
Imports of Fertilizers (by type) in Pakistan (1969-70 to 1972-73) 
(Product Weight in Metric Tons) 
Type of Fertilizer 
Year • Total 
Urea DAP Other 
1969-70 607,571 10,000 30,070 647,641 
1970-71 193,782 72,861 33,905 300,548 
1971-72 153,130 — — 153,130 
1972-73 193,601 137,895 29,219° 366,715 
(1973-74) (409,000) (190,920) (112,000)6 (711,920) 
Source: Chemical Consultants, Lahore. 
Note: 1973-74 figures are projections. 
"Nitrophos (23% N, 23 %P) 
^Nitrophos 46,000; Ammonium Sulphate (21 %N) 50,000, Sulphate of Potash 
(50 %K) 10,000. 
Fertilizers are imported under a number of different administrative 
and financial terms—outright gifts, long-term credits (U.S. AID and other 
bilateral aid programmes), barter, and cash. Pakistan has received 
fertilizer gifts or cash-purchased foreign fertilizers in only small quantities. 
The Central Government usually makes cash purchases monthly from 
near by countries (such as Kuwait) only in emergency situations. Barter 
deals are made with East European countries. 
Relative Roles of Domestic Production and Imports 
The relative roles of domestic production and imports in terms of total 
supply have varied from year to year. Data for the year 1970-71, 1971-72 
and 1972-73 are summarized in Table 5. 
Domestic production of nitrogenous fertilizers is proportionately 
far more important than of phosphatic fertilizer. The relative impor-
tance of domestic nitrogen production grew with the commencement of 
production at the D.H. Urea plant, Sheikhupura, in the early 1970's. 
By the 1972-73 season, 70% of the nitrogenous fertilizer was produced 
domestically and 30% was imported. 
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Table 11 
Percentage of Total Supply of Fertilizers Provided by Domestic Production and Imports 
in Pakistan (1970-71 to 1972-73) 
Year Fertilizer type Domestic Production Import 
(%) (%) 
1970-71 Nitrogenous 54.6 45.4 
Phosphatic 11.2 88.8 
Potash — 100.00 
Total" 47.0 53.0 
1971-72 Nitrogenous 75.3 24.7 
Phosphatic 100.0 — 
Total" 75.7 24.3 
1972-73 Nitrogenous 70.0 30.0 
Phosphatic 112.0 88.8 
Total" 60.3 39.7 
Source: Calculated from Tables 1 and 3. 
a 
Based on addition of fertilizer weights in metric tons. 
The proportion of total fertilizer supply provided by domestic pro-
duction may well have reached a temporary peak in 1972-73 or 1973-74 
with full D.H. urea production. As domestic production stablizes over 
the next few years and as demand increases, imports may play an increa-
singly important role, depending on world prices. 
Consumption 
Supply is not the same as consumption because of storage carry-over. 
If consumption is measured by movement to retail outlets where storage 
is minimal, then the trend in use is as shown in Table 6. The trend is 
clearly one of steady increase in the consumption of nitrogenous fertili-
zers but of more sporadic growth in the case of phosphatic fertilizers. 
Distribution of fertilizer sales has been seasonal, with peaks occurring 
twice a year, reflecting the two growing seasons. The peaks for nitroge-
nous fertilizers during the 1971-72 season were in July-August and 
January-February. The peaks for phosphatic fertilizers during the same 
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Tabic 6 
Consumption of Fertilizers in Pakistan (1962-63 to 1972-73) 
(Metric Tons) 
Fertilizers 
Year — 
Nitrogenous Phosphatic 
1962-63 41,160 ... 210 
1963-64 67,620 ... 630 
1964-65 84,147 .. . 1,029 
1965-66 69,242 . . . 1,245 
1966-67 107,779 ... . . . 3,911 
1967-68 177,441 ... . . . 12,777 
1968-69 203,521 .. . . . . 38,642 
1969-70 252,566 . . . . . . 33,801 
1970-71 271,500 ... ... 30,462 
1971-72 343,900 ... . . . 37,231 
1972-73 386,385 .. . ... 48,730 
Source: Chemical Consultants, Lahore (Compiled from Government Statistics). 
season were in October-November and May, the former accounting for 
24% of the season's total. Over the last few years, fertilizer distribution 
has become more even over the season. 
The regional distribution pattern shows a strong concentration in 
the Punjab followed by Sind. The consumption in the NWFP and 
Baluchistan was relatively small. The province-wise breakdown of ferti-
lizer distribution percentages during the 1971-72 season was as follows: 
Fertilizer Distribution as % of W. Pak. Total 
Province 
Nitrogenous Phosphatic 
Punjab 65.8 68.1 
Sind 25.5 21.7 
NWFP 8.5 9.8 
Baluchistan 0.2 0.4 
Total: 100.0 100.0 
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The distribution pattern was determined by agricultural production, 
cropping patterns, and other factors.* The distribution pattern of fertili-
zers in 1973 like this: Punjab 67%, Sind 22.5%, NWFP 9% and 
Baluchistan 1.5%. 
Present Distribution System 
We have already traced the evolution of fertilizer production and 
distribution in Pakistan. Here, we will focus on some more detailed 
aspects of distribution, particularly at the retail level. 
As far as domestic fertilizer production is concerned, half of the 
D.H. production goes to the public sector (PASCO) and half to the 
private sector, principally in the Punjab and the NWFP. ESSO production 
is entirely distributed through its agents, principally in Sind, though 
little is distributed in lower Sind. All the PIDC production goes to the 
public sector, principally to the PASCO (Punjab). 
Under the distribution system in operation prior to September 1973, 
three main stages were involved: principal agents, agents at the mandi 
town level, and sub-agents. As noted earlier, there were six principal 
agents. A survey in early 1970 [2, p. 61] revealed a total of 1,697 agents 
distributed as follows: 
Province Privatea Publicb Total 
Punjab 928 161 1,089 
Sind 403 53 456 
NWFP 101 36 137 
Baluchistan 11 4 15 
Total: 1,443 254 1,697 
"Dawood, ESSO, Jaffer and PNO. bADC and RSCC. 
The number of sub-agents was not known, but it appears that their role 
was not very important [2, pp. 126 and 128]*; it may have grown since 
•We are not certain how much attention is given to actual farm demand as com-
pared with the potential demand suggested by the above factors. 
4While some principal agents reported many sub-agents, a village level survey 
revealed comparatively few of them, and often they were close by in the same town. 
They were, in reality, 'usually no more than the extension of mandi town agents', own 
activities but under different names." Further, they were "doing a large business by 
the use of improper means." 
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then. The number of agents probably continued to grow through 
1973. 
In September 1973, as noted, distribution was provincialized in the 
Punjab and Baluchistan. This process, in turn, had some repercussions 
in Sind. 
The Punjab 
Provincialization had by far the most profound eifect in the Punjab. 
We noted above that in early 1970, there were 1,089 agents (928 private, 
161 public) in operation; by early 1973 their total number was estimated 
to have grown to about 1,800. In addition, there were about 700 sub-
agents.6 
Following provincialization, the total number of agents was reduced 
to about 875. Private agents were reduced to approximately 275 while 
public outlets were increased to 600. At the private level, the four 
principal agents were reduced to two, namely, Dawood and ESSO. 
ESSO's operations were limited to the southern portion of the province. 
Dawood had 200 agents and ESSO 75. Tt is not known how many public 
outlets were operating just before provincialization, but if we assume an 
increase from 161 in 1970, it might not be incorrect to suggest that about 
400 new outlets were added after provincialization.8 
The number of sales points was cut atleast to half by provincialization 
—from perhaps 1800 (excluding sub-agents) to less than 900. If sub-
agents are included, the number of operators was cut by about two-
thirds (from 2,500). At first review, this may seem like retrogression in 
terms of getting fertilizer to the country-side. However, precise evalua-
tion is not possible at this stage as a number of points cloud the issue. 
The question of geographic distribution is perhaps the most intrac-
table. Private agents, before provincialization, were generally located at 
the mcrndi town level and several agents were located in some towns. It 
has been suggested that a total of no more than 283 locations were involved 
"Estimate provided by a private firm. The same total number (2,500) was 
mentioned by the PASCO. 
"Some sales are made to co-operatives but we do not know the total volume, 
nor do we know their relative importance before provincialization. Hence they are 
excluded from this discussion. 
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but the derivation of this figure is not given and it is contested by some. 
According to the PASCO, they had 600 agents in different locations with 
seven or more in each tehsil. 
It was not possible to go into this important matter further, but a 
number of questions come to mind. Were the 600 outlets actually in 
effective operation? How are they located? As the private distribution 
system covered major agricultural areas, has the system actually made 
fertilizer more readily available to farmers? Since farmers are accustomed 
to going to mandi towns to sell produce and to buy fertilizer as well as other 
inputs, does it make any difference? These and other questions need to 
be studied. However, there is no gainsaying the fact that a profound 
change was made over a very short period of time in the fertilizer distri-
bution system in the Punjab. A more thorough evaluation is needed 
before firm conclusions can be drawn. This will be difficult because (i) 
the country was recovering from flood damage during the provincialization 
period, and (ii) the credit system was changed concurrently. 
Sind 
Although fertilizer distribution was not provincialized in Sind, it 
shows the same basic division between public and private firms. Public 
distribution is in the hands of the Sind Agricultural Supply Corporation 
(SASCO) which in turn makes use of many private dealers. Private dis-
tribution is by ESSO, which, in drawing back from much of the Punjab 
after provincialization, replaced three private firms. 
SASCO basically deals with imported fertilizer while ESSO dealers 
handle the firm's domestic production of urea (86% of which is marketed 
in Sind). SASCO, as of November 15, 1973, had about 91 sales agents 
and 300 dealers. It planned to increase the number of the latter to 500. 
ESSO, as of November 1973, had about 175 agents. 
SASCO plans to introduce a system of fertilizer cards to provide a 
more complete control over distribution. The fertilizer card, to be 
verified by a revenue officer, will indicate the type and nature of land 
holdings and cropping. This will help determine the fertilizer needs of 
individual farmers. Views differ on whether the system will be effective 
in promoting fertilizer consumption. 
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The North-West Frontier Province 
Fertilizer distribution in the NWFP continues basically in the same 
pattern as it has followed for several years. It is a combination of 
government agencies and private firms. 
The principal government group is the Agricultural Development 
Authority (ADA), formerly the Agricultural Supplies Organisation. 
It markets about 40% of the province's allocation of imported fertilizer 
and 50% of its domestic fertilizer allocation. Twenty percent of the 
imported total is actually allocated to the Integrated Rural Development 
Programme but is distributed by the ADA. The ADA has 20 of its own 
sale points, which handle most of its sales, and 80 commission agents. 
In addition, the Rural Supply Cooperative Corporation handles about 
16.25% of the domestic fertilizer allocation. 
The private sector markets 60% of the province's allocation of impor-
ted fertilizer and 33.75% of the domestic fertilizer allocation. The 
sector consists of three principal agents, viz., PNO, Dawood Corpora-
tion and Jalfer Brothers, in the case of imported fertilizer. In the case 
of domestic fertilizer, these three are accompanied by several other 
groups, e.g., Agricultural Enterprises, Agprise Farm Services Syndicate, 
and Karimi Enterprises. 
Because of its relatively remote location from the sources of imported 
and domestic fertilizer supplies, the province experiences some difficulty 
in obtaining adequate and reasonably priced transportation. 
Baluchistan 
Although very little fertilizer is currently used in Baluchistan, i.e., 
about 1.5% of the national total of available supplies, the province holds 
considerable potential for increased use. The main limitations are (i) 
the widely scattered nature of agriculture which is found widely scattered 
in small pockets over a land area representing 42% of the country's total 
and (ii) the concurrent need for matching irrigation. As of the 1972-73 
season, only five private dealers were reported in Baluchistan.7 They 
limited their activities primarily to the Quetta region and moved only 
'We noted earlier that 11 private dealers were reported in 1970. 
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5,500 metric tons of fertilizer. In order to broaden fertilizer distribution 
into the outlying regions, distribution was provincialized in the summer of 
1973 and turned over to the Baluchistan Government's Department of 
Agriculture. The department had, by November, established 36 sales out-
lets and planned to raise the number to 54. It expected to distribute 
21,000 tons of fertilizer during 1973-74—nearly a fourfold increase. Dis-
tribution is being tied in with a large fertilizer demonstration programme 
on wheat. Whether the department will be able to carry out distribution 
over wide areas for the marketing margin of Rs. 73 per ton allowed else-
where is questionable; some increment may be needed. 
Proposed Fertilizer Plant Construction 
No fertilizer plants were under construction in Pakistan in November 
1973. However, contracts were signed for the construction of an addi-
tional WPIDC facility at Multan. Several others were at an advanced 
stage of discussion or negotiation. These are outlined in Table 7. 
It will probably take a minimum of three years before the first new 
plant comes into commission, and even longer before it reaches full pro-
duction. Thus, it will be at the earliest 1976-77 (more likely, 1977-78) 
before increased domestic fertilizer production becomes available. 
Pricing, Costs and Subsidies 
The formal retail price for fertilizer in Pakistan is set by the Central 
Government. Different prices are set for each of the several forms of 
fertilizer and each price is the same throughout the country. The 
Central Government also sets the marketing margins, known as 
incidentals. It has less control, at least directly, over actual costs of 
domestic production or of imports; but costs of these are used in setting 
the marketing margin and the retail price. Since retail prices do not 
cover import costs, a subsidy is involved. 
Retail Prices 
The official retail price for fertilizer has increased sharply since 
September 1972. The increases have reflected (i) increased costs of 
imports (both raw materials and finished products) which in turn were 
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sharply influenced by devaluations and (ii) a desire to set a more realistic 
price that would reduce the cost of subsidies and lessen the influence 
of the black market. 
While prices for nearly all fertilizers have increased, the situation is 
the perhaps most simply and sharply illustrated by the case of urea 
prices of which moved as follows: 
Price in Rupees per 
Period 
110-lb. bag Metric Ton 
August 1971 to September 25, 1972 28 560 
Sept. 26, 1972 to March 30, 1973 35 700 
March 31, 1973 to August 14, 1973 42 840 
August 14, 1973 to Nov., 73 55 1,100 
Thus the price of urea fertilizer increased by 96% within one year. 
During the same period, however, the support, price for wheat was raised 
twice, amounting to a total increase of 18%. The support price has been 
well below the actual market prices and the prices of other farm crops 
have risen much higher. 
As of November 1973, retail prices for the various types of fertilizers 
ranged as follows on a metric ton basis. 
Fertilizer Type Retail Price 
(Rupees) 
Nitrogenous 
Urea 1,100 
Ammonium sulphate 490 
Ammonium sulphate nitrate 620 
Compound 
Diammonium phosphate 1,140 
Nitrophos 1,100 
Phosphates and potash 
Single superphosphate 295 
Triple superphosphate 680 
Sulphate of potash 640 
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There is no difference in the retail prices of imported and domestically 
produced fertilizers of the same type. As might be expected, there are 
some variations from these formal prices. 
Retailers are permitted to lower prices if they are willing to take a 
cut in their own returns. This is not common but may occur in a few 
areas where competition is severe or in off seasons. There may be some 
price discounting of the urea produced by the PIDC plants because the urea 
is in powder form whereas farmers prefer the granular form. Some 
farmers who were short on cash are known to have used a Government 
loan to buy fertilizer at the official prices and then to have sold it at a lower 
price to other farmers willing to pay cash. This provides the original 
farmer a source of operating capital. 
Although prohibited, some fertilizer has been sold for more than 
the official prices. This is black market and is, of course, common where 
demand exceeds supply. Unconfirmed estimates suggest that, on an 
average, perhaps 25% of the fertilizer (30% in the Khar if and 20% in the 
Rabi seasons) was sold in this way during the last year or two in the Punjab. 
The premium paid was thought to be generally no more than Rs. 2 to 
Rs. 8 per bag of urea during the peak period of demand but usually was 
less. Higher premia have been reported for the other types of fertilizers 
in the NWFP. Since it is risky for the dealer to make such sales himself, 
an intermediary may often be used. In order to reduce the black market, 
the Government has, as noted, increased prices. 
Wholesale Prices 
The wholesale price is basically the ex-plant price for imported ferti-
lizer. Wholesale prices may be tempered by subsidies and taxes although 
they do not all necessarily enter the system at this point. 
Ex-plant prices have been established for each of the fertilizers pro-
duced in Pakistan. These prices include all costs and a profit of about 
20% for the foreign-owned firms. The prices are established by the 
Government after consultation with the firms. 
In the case of urea, the average ex-plant price was stated as Rs. 
850/m.t. in August 1973. Prices of fertilizer from different plants, however, 
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seem to vary, ranging from Rs. 648 for Dawood-Hercules and Rs. 677 
for ESSO to approximately Rs. 1,022 for the PIDC plants. The first two 
are low enough to be able to compete in the international market. 
In addition to the ex-plant price, a development surcharge of Rs. 400 
is added to the Dawood-Hercules cost and Rs. 324 is added to the ESSO 
cost. A final equalizer is a varying set of marketing margins which will be 
discussed in a following section. 
The precise plant costs and profit levels are, of course, things in 
publicising which the private firms are not interested. However, one 
of the urea producers was kind enough to outline his major costs for us. 
They are approximately as follows: 
Variable (Rs./m.t.) Fixed (Rs./m.t.) 
Raw materials 95 Depreciation 172 
Bags and liners 100 Interest on loans 100 
Chemical catalyst 21 Salaries, employee 
benefits, overheads 75 
Other 30 Maintenance materials 12 
Sub-total 245 Sub-total 359 
The costs are, of course, subject to variation depending on purchase prices 
and the efficiency of output. The low variable costs are due to a relative 
abundance of the modestly-priced natural gas in Pakistan. The current 
price of the gas supplied to the plant is Rs. 2.56 per 1,000 cubic ft. which 
we understand, is near the lower end of the price range in the United States. 
Another urea plant is somewhat older and considerably smaller. 
Its unit costs appear to be slightly higher, as might be expected. The 
PIDC plant has much higher raw material costs, evidently due to its use 
of ammonia produced by obsolete machinery. In the older plants, lower 
efficiency and higher maintenance costs may be partially offset by lower 
depreciation and interest charges. 
It appears that current profit levels are at least adequate for the 
private firms. The ESSO plant declared a profit of 20 % last year, and an 
interim profit of 37 % this year. Neither (American) parent company is 
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considering expansion, but the Dawood Corporation, not to be confused 
with Dawood-Hercules, is in an advanced stage of negotiations. 
Import Prices 
Import prices per metric ton vary widely from year to year and, 
recently, even within years depending largely upon which countries the 
fertilizer imports are made from. In 1968-69, for example, urea imports 
from the United States were most costly (8 118 to $ 126, CIF) followed by 
those from Canada ($117), Italy and France ($99.5 each), USSR and 
Bulgaria ($95 each), and Kuwait ($68.) Data compiled on arrivals during 
the fall of 1973 showed much the same pattern. CIF urea prices from 
other sources were: Holland $ 96.60, Kuwait $ 102 and Japan $ 87.24. 
Undoubtedly, a substantial part of the high import cost of fertilizer 
imports from the U.S.A. is due to higher transportation costs. These 
imports must come the longest distance and by the most expensive shipping. 
The U.S. regulations require that at least half of the fertilizers exported by 
that country must be shipped in U.S. carriers, which have rates two to 
three times higher than those of other countries. The annual FOB value 
of U.S. fertilizer shipments to Pakistan since 1966 has varied from a low of 
$ 1.9 million in 1970-71 to a high of $ 26.5 million in 1972-73. 
Fluctuations in annual prices have recently become particularly 
sharp. In the US fiscal year 1970, the FOB sale price of urea in the United 
States was $ 81.47 per/m.t. No urea sales were made in the fiscal years 
1971 and 1972. In the fiscal year 1973, the first sale to Pakistan was made 
at $ 93.00/m.t. (plus ocean freight); by June the price had increased to 
$ 115.57, and by November the bid price was $ 170; and even at that only 
one-quarter of the tender was met. The latter bid was not accepted, and 
a subsequent one in November elicited no bids. 
For a number of reasons, the later increases have not become very 
evident in the thinking of many of those we interviewed. Average CIF 
prices quoted in discussions were usually below the June figure, cited above, 
plus transportation. Firstly, there is a lag between the offering of the 
bid and the signing on the one hand and actual delivery on the other. One 
study suggested that this lag averaged about nine months. Secondly, the 
fertilizers are priced in accordance with costs at the time of purchase, not 
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at current market prices. Thirdly, the Agricultural Supply Organisa-
tion handles all purchases so that relatively only a few individuals get close 
to the current world fertilizer situations. 
In any case, it is evident that at present the cost of urea produced 
in modern plants in Pakistan is well below that of imports and probably 
below those occurring in more normal periods in the past. Low cost 
natural gas is a major factor. Because of this, Pakistan has the potential 
to become an exporter of urea in the future. It may not have quite the 
same advantage in phosphatic fertilizers, though domestic sources are 
known and plant construction is contemplated. 
The relative cost differential of domestic fertilizer production, at 
least of urea, compared with the currently increasing cost of fertilizer 
imports will be substantial and of growing importance in the future. 
Marketing Margin (Incidentals) 
The marketing margin, commonly known as incidentals, covers all 
the services performed from point of production or import to the point of 
actual sale to the farmer. The overall size of this margin is controlled by 
the Government of Pakistan. Following annual investigations of actual 
costs, it also establishes the margin to be paid for individual components 
of the margin for each of the types of fertilizers sold. The components 
for domestically produced as well as imported urea and DAP are outlined 
in Table 8 in which components are sorted into three categories: (1) 
administrative costs, including retail margin; (2) transportation, handling 
and storage costs; and (3) port charges. 
It may be seen that the margin for domestically produced urea 
(Rs. 101/m.t.) was the same in September 1973 as during the 1969-70 
season. In fact, the commission paid to the retail agent for both domes-
tically produced and imported fertilizers has remained the same (Rs. 22) 
for both the periods. The same is true of sales promotion charges (Re. 
1.0), unforeseen charges (Rs. 5.5) handling charges (Rs. 12.5 at railhead 
and Rs. 20.0 to non-mandi towns) and storage charges (Rs. 5.0). Those 
showing slight increases include organisation and administration charges 
(Rs. 6.0 to Rs. 7.0 respectively), wharfage and wharf rent (Rs. 2.0 to 
Rs. 2.5) and purchase and inspection costs (Rs. 4.0 to Rs. 5.8). More 
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substantial increases in the imported category were reported—their 
extent varying by type of fertilizer—for bank commissions (Rs. 6.0 to 
Rs. 8.3; Rs. 6.0 to Rs. 13.5), interest charges (Rs. 15.0 to Rs. 61.7; Rs. 
15.0 to Rs. 75.3), railway charges on imported fertilizer (Rs. 32.2 to Rs. 
54.9), and in stevedoring (Rs. 9.7 to Rs. 14.3; Rs. 9.7 to 19.1). It is not 
clear why interest charges have gone lip so much. The reason why 
railway charges went up for imported and not for domestic fertilizer is also 
not known. The result, in any case, has been a substantial increase in 
the margin for imported urea (+56%) and DAP (+75%). Thus, the 
current margin or incidental charges for imported fertilizers is well over 
twice that of domestically produced fertilizers. 
Since these are generalized charges, there is naturally some variation 
from them in specific instances. This seems to be particularly true of 
domestically produced urea. Despite an overall margin of Rs. 101 we 
did not find any firms actually achieving that margin. The closest was 
ESSO with a margin of Rs. 99. In the case of urea produced by the 
PIDC, a margin of Rs. 78 was allowed, and in the case of urea produced 
by Dawood-Hercules, it was Rs. 52. Much, if not all, of the variation is 
due to transportation cost differentials; the market area for ESSO ferti-
lizers involves longer distance than those of the other two firms which have 
their plants in the Punjab. The PIDC makes greater use of rail freight 
than the Dawood-Hercules which is able to distribute 80% of its produc-
tion within a 200-mile radius by truck. Due to these and other factors, 
there can be considerable variations in marketing margins even within a 
province. The PASCO, for example, handles urea produced by both the 
PIDC and the D-H in the Punjab; the marketing margin on the two 
differs by Rs. 26. One might suspect that such a wide differential could 
lead to (i) some difficulties for the PASCO which markets both types of 
fertilizer, or (ii) some inequities between the PASCO and the private firm.8 
Out of the margins for imported fertilizers, the Punjab and Sind 
Agricultural Supply Organisations are allowed Rs. 72 (71.5) to meet 
their operation costs. 
8In partial defence of this variation, it might be argued that PASCO's costs are 
higher because it is setting up largely new distribution units which will handle only 
fertilizer and seed. Dawood units, on the other hand, can sell not only D-H urea among 
fertilizers but can handle also a range of other agricultural items. We were not in a 
position to pursue such questions. 
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Table 11 
Composition of Generalized Marketing or Incidental Costs (Administrative, Transportation 
and Port Charges1) for Urea and DAP Fertilizers, 1969-70 and late 1973 
Urea DAP 
Head of Cost Domestic Imported Imported 
1969-70 Sept. 1969-70 Sept. 1969-70 Sept. 
1973 1973 1973 
(Rupees per Metric Ton) 
Administrative Costs 
Bank commission on letter of 
credit 1.2 1.2 6 .0 8.3 6 .0 13.5 
Organisation and administration 6 . 0 6 . 0 6 .0 7 .0 6 .0 7 . 0 
Interest charges 12.5 12.5 15.0 l 61.7 s 15.0 75.3 s 
Sales promotion 1.0 1 .0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Commission to retail agent 22.0 22.0 22 .0 22.0 22.0 22 .0 
Unforeseen 5 .0 5 .0 5 .0 5 .0 5 .0 5 .0 
Sub-total 47.7 47 .7 55.0 105.5 55.0 124.3 
Transportation, Handling and Storage 
Railway charges 15.5 15.5 32.2 54.9 32.2 54.9 
Handling at railhead and up 
to sale point 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
Handling to non-mandi towns 20 .0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20 .0 
Storage charges 5 .0 5 .0 5 .0 5 .0 5 .0 5 .0 
Sub-total 53.0 53.0 69.2 92.4 69.7 92 .4 
Port Charges 
2 .5 Wharfage/wharf rent — — 2 . 0 2 .5 2 . 0 
Purchasing and inspection — — 4 . 0 5 .8 4 . 0 5 .8 
Stevedoring, clearing, and 
3 .7 10.84 forwarding — — 3.7 6 .0 
Sub-total — — 9 .7 14.3 9 .7 19.1 
G R A N D TOTAL 100.7 100.7 133.9 212.3 134.9 235.9 
Rounded 101.0 101.0 134.0 212.0 135.0 236.0 
Source: For 1969-70, [2, p. 49], 
For Sept. 1973, Table provided by Agricultural Supply Organisation, Karachi. 
"Effective from 16th August, 1973." 
'Normally these three categories would be grouped under marketing, but 
for expository purposes it has been decided to separate them. 
•Interest charges on funds arranged by the A D C for purchases and handling 
of fertilizer at an average rate of 8 % per annum for four months' turnover 
of domestic production and 6 months' turnover on imported fertilizer. 
'Interest charges on funds arranged by the FDAS for purchase and handling 
of fertilizer at an average rate of 10% per annum for four months' turnover 
of imported fertilizer. 
'Includes bagging cost on board ship at dockside, Rs. 4.41/m.t. bag pro-
vided with bulk shipment. 
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Despite these variations, all firms felt that the margin was tight for it 
fails to provide room for either financing or for adjusting quickly to major 
changes in costs. Major increases in rail freight for domestically pro-
duced fertilizer (-)-54%) and for gasoline, for instance, were announced 
during the period of our study. The firms will have to go to the Govern-
ment for a change in margin allowance. It is not clear how this would 
then affect the rest of the price structure. 
Surcharge and Subsidies 
The present pricing structure is a combination of surcharges and 
subsidies. As Table 9 shows, substantial surcharges are imposed on the 
urea production of the two private plants. At the same time, substantial 
subsidies are needed to reduce the price of imported fertilizer. Suppo-
sedly, the surcharges are used to offset the susbsidies. Where this is not 
the case, it is the policy of the Central and Provincial Governments to 
share the costs of the subsidies equally between themselves. 
It is possible that the surcharge/subsidy plan was near to breaking 
even in mid-1973. If so, this was a unique situation since it has not been 
the case in the past, nor is it likely to be in the future. During the 11-
year period between 1955-56 and 1965-66, the average fertilizer subsidy 
ranged between 25% and 66% of the fertilizer cost and averaged 48% 
[2, p. 12]. The net cost of the subsidy during the 1969-70 season was 
reportedly Rs. 13.80 crore and represented about 22% of total fertilizer 
cost. The proportionate cost was, interestingly, higher on domestic 
(28.5%) than on imported (18.9%) fertilizer [2, p. 48], Higher prices 
on recent international purchases suggest that the subsidy will need to be 
increased in the next few months. In the coming few years, as domestic 
urea production remains at roughly the same levels and import costs 
remain at their current high levels, the cost of subsidy (assuming that the 
current retail price levels are retained) could become very substantial. 
Summary Comparison 
The preceding discussion and statistics are summarized for urea and 
DAP in Table 9. Current 1973 data as well as comparative data for 1969-
70 are included. Total cost figures have increased sharply between the 
two periods, but, in the case of ESSO, much of this was due to the 
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Table 11 
Summary of Estimated Cost, Price and Subsidy Breakdown for Urea and DAP Fertilizer, 
Pakistan, Fall 1973 
Urea D A P 
Domestic Production Imported Imported 
D .H . ESSO PIDC PASCO PASCO 
(Rupees per Metric Ton) 
Late 1973 
Cost of product 648 677 1,022 l,186fc 1,462c 
Marketing Margin 
(incidentals) 52 99 78 212^ 236d 
Development surcharge" 400 3246 — — — 
Total cost 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,398 1,698 
Farm price 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,140 
Subsidy ("profit") 
Proportion of cost (400) (324) — 298 558 
1969-70 
Cost of production — 457 713 500 540 
Marketing margin 
(incidentals) — 101 101 135 135 
Total cost 558 814 635 675 
Farm price 520 573 520 500 
Subsidy — 38 241 115 175 
Proportion of cost — 6 . 8 % 29 .6% 18.1% 2 5 . 9 % 
Source: For 1973, (i) the tables which are given later in this study, (ii) interviews in 
Lahore and Karachi, and (iii) data from the US AID. 
For 1969-70, (2, pp. 48-49). 
Notes • aLevied by the Government and appears below in the table in parentheses as a 
"profit." 
^As reported by the Government in August and presumably an average of 
shipments from several countries. If only shipments from the U.S. 
were included, the figure would be higher. For example, an AID con-
tract was signed on June 22 for 30,000 tons of urea in bags at an FOB 
price of 8115.57/m.t. A subsequent agreement early in November was 
for 8 170.00/m.t. The ocean shipping cost f rom the U.S. which is higher 
than for other nations, was about 864.50/m.t. This would bring the 
relative CIF costs up to about 8180 and 8234/m.t. respectively. 
c As reported by the Government in August and presumably an average of 
shipments from several countries. If only shipments from the U.S 
were included, the figure would be higher. For example, agreements for 
197,500 tons of DAP in bulk, with empty bags, signed in fiscal 1972 
averaged S109.90/m.t. A contract for 5,000 tons was signed on September 
28 at a price of 8138.85/m.t. The shipping cost in both was 854.04/m.t. 
for a ship arriving in November. This would bring the total C I F costs 
up to roughly 8164 and 8193. The bagging cost in port is about Rs. 
4.4/m.t. and is included in the port charges in these calculations. 
' 'Transport charges to some parts of the country could raise this figure. 
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imposition of the development surcharge. The farm price of fertilizers 
has almost doubled. The increase in price has led to a removal, for the 
moment at least, of the subsidy on domestic production. The PIDC seems 
to be breaking even. Because of increases of over 100% in the CIF cost 
of imports and substantial expansion in the incidentals category, the sub-
sidy on imports has increased rather than decreased. It is likely to in-
crease further in the future since the cost of imported urea is almost twice 
the cost of domestic fertilizer, excluding the development surcharge. 
Problem Areas 
It may be useful to divide our discussion of problem areas into two 
main components:(a) those likely to affect the country as a whole; and (b) 
those found in various provinces. Our evaluations are necessarily tenta-
tive and, in some cases, subjective. National problems, in turn, can be 
divided into three major sub-sectors: over-all supply, wholesale distri-
bution and retail marketing. 
Over-all Supply 
Pakistan's present supply of fertilizers is generally thought to be 
inadequate. The situation is likely to get worse over the next three or 
four years. The demand for fertilizers is expected to continue to grow 
while domestic production is expected to increase only marginally. 
Increased imports will, therefore, be needed.® Current imports are heavily 
subsidized. Subsequent purchases will be made at higher prices which 
means that the CIF price will soon be even higher and in the near future 
there may be problems in obtaining bids at any price. An AID tender in 
late November 1973 elicited no bids. Whether this will be covered by 
even higher subsidies or prices is not yet clear. If world fertilizer prices 
continue to rise, Pakistan will indeed be in a difficult situation with regard 
to imports. 
A large portion of the fertilizers imported in the past has come from 
the United States. The CIF prices of these shipments have been 25% 
'This point has been made in several projections. One of the most recent, con-
cerning nitrogen and containing some rather optimistic projections on new plant cons-
truction, shows a considerable excess of demand over supply through 1976-77. Unless 
demand growth slips off, or plant construction moves faster than anticipated, it might 
be a year or two later. Some revised projections would be most desirable. 
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higher, or more, than of those from other countries. This is due in large 
part to the great distances the fertilizer must be shipped and the high cost 
of shipping. Pakistan does get fertilizer from a wide range of other 
countries and one wonders why it does not get more from them. The 
answer may lie in the ready availability of supplies and softness of terms. 
Still, there is a point where high price outweighs softness of terms. 
In the face of these problems and in view of the availability of ample 
supplies of relatively low cost natural gas domestically, it appears logical 
that all possible attention should be given to expanding the output of 
nitrogenous fertilizers as fast as possible. Since phosphatic rock is avail-
able in the NWFP, the phosphatic variety, too, could well be produced. 
Discussions and negotiations concerning specific plants, and phosphate 
mining in particular, should be sharply expedited.10 How many plants 
should be built beyond the replacement of imports, however, is a different 
matter and is beyond the scope of this study. 
Wholesale Distribution 
An increase in the supply of fertilizers is useless if it does not reach 
the farmer. The current seasonality of demand can create severe pres-
sures on transportation facilities. If distribution could be made on a 
more even basis, more rational use could be made of existing transport 
capacity. But this would simultaneously require imported storage 
facilities. 
While some of the best agricultural areas may be relatively well off 
in terms of distribution points, many interior areas evidently are not. 
There seems to be a general agreement that more distribution points are 
needed everywhere, particularly in the interior. The poorest farmers do 
not have a tractor to haul their fertilizers. Indeed, in extreme cases, 
they may have to carry the 110-lb. sack on their back for many miles. 
Naturally, fairly ready access to a distribution point would facilitate and 
encourage fertilizer use. 
The current marketing margins (or incidentals) make no direct pro-
vision for technical services to retailers or farmers. Some firms felt 
10This matter is discussed in some detail in [3]. 
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that the farmers needed more technical help. It was not possible to 
judge whether the technical information currently available was inadequate, 
or in case it was so, who should provide it. The matter needs further 
study. 
Retail Distribution 
It has been noted that the price of urea to the farmer has gone up 
thrice in a year and, in the process, about doubled. Prices of other 
fertilizers have also gone up. This increase was softened by concurrent 
increases in the support prices for wheat and in general price levels for 
agricultural products. The cost/price situation may not be as severe as 
it seems. It would be desirable, however, that a study be made of the 
net effect of these adjustments on the income level of various sizes and 
types of farms. 
A somewhat different matter concerns the selection of fertilizers 
available. In some cases, the desired types of fertilizers were either not 
available in time, or not available without a tie-in purchase of some less 
desired fertilizer, or even not available at all. Some farmers in the 
Lyallpur area, for instance, found superphosphate very short in supply 
before the rabi season. Others said they were required to buy three bags 
of urea in order to get one bag of DAP. 
Provincial Problems 
Each of the provinces in Pakistan faces somewhat different problems 
in pricing and distribution of fertilizer. Here, we will primarily focus on 
the Punjab and Sind which, together, use over 90% of the total fertilizer 
consumed in the country. The problems appear to be particularly great 
in the Punjab. Some brief additional comment will also be included on 
the NWFP. 
The Punjab 
As we noted earlier, the distribution of fertilizer in the Punjab was 
provincialized during September 1973. In a handout distributed during 
a press conference on August 28, 1973, announcing provincialization it 
was stated that the "Private sector failed to help the farmers due to: 
(1) black marketing, (2) smuggling, (3) hoarding, and (4) inequitable 
distribution." 
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The statement went on to say: 
"It happened because fertilizer was being sold in big 
cities/towns only and consumers could not keep a watch 
on its distribution. At the same time Private Sector 
insisted on maximum profiteering from this trade. 
Governor gave repeated warnings to the Private Sector, 
to improve their performance and assist the Government 
in helping the farming community, but. there was no 
favourable response." 
How much support does there appear to have been to these charges? 
The Government presented no further information in its press release 
and did not cite any particular inquiries or investigations.11 We found no 
proof, but gathered from various discussions that some black marketing, 
smuggling, and hoarding had indeed been carried out but this, however, 
was more a function of a shortage of supply than of the type of distribu-
tion system, except possibly in the case of hoarding. The black market 
and smuggling problems should have been reduced by the most recent 
fertilizer price increase which was announced several weeks before pro-
vincialization. 
The question of inequitable distribution is one that has been already 
touched on above and is difficult to document. The detailed study done 
for AID in 1970 did not suggest any special deficiencies at the sales agent 
level in the Punjab, though problems were noted in the NWFP which 
province was principally served by public agencies. The private distri-
butors were thickly spread throughout the Punjab plain. A dot map 
kept by Dawood, for instance, shows very few agriculturally important 
areas which were very far from a sales point. Of course, some of the less 
important areas, or those in the rainfed zone which make less use of 
fertilizer, were less well served. This latter point may have led to a 
certain inequity in a social, if not economic, sense. 
A further problem was that the principal agents, who received four 
month's credit from the fertilizer suppliers, were criticised for not passing 
on the credit to their agent and, in turn, to farmers. The four month's 
credit, however, was cut back to one month early in the year. Most of 
the agents were not in a financial position to offer credit on their own. 
"One possible relevant report may be [12]. We did not see the Survey Report 
but understand from reference to it that it noted the credit problems which the small 
farmers faced in buying fertilizer. See [9, p. 75], 
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There are serious problems involved in sharply changing the system 
in a very short period of time. In the case of fertilizer distribution, private 
and public firms faced difficulty in readjustments. 
The Punjab Agricultural Supply Corporation had a difficult task to 
perform. It had opened up some 400 new agencies in a very short period 
and had to organise the physical distribution of the fertilizers to these 
outlets as well as to make a multitude of other arrangements. It is not 
known yet how well these things were done, but it is a miracle that they 
were accomplished at all. But more fundamental problems still remain. 
The PASCO outlets are required to make financial go of things when 
handling only one rather seasonal commodity, while the Dawood dealers 
usually handle a number of other items. They are expected to pay their 
own way when using salaried Government employees. Outlets are not 
scheduled to be open in the evening. Besides, many of them are new and 
farmers may not know about them or how to find them. 
It would seem that the shift is likely to make fertilizer distribution more 
difficult in both public and private sectors, at least for a while, and may 
affect the rabi crop. Statistics seem to bear this out (Table 10). 
Table 10 
Stocks and Sales of Nitrogen Fertilizers in the Punjab: July to December, 1973 
(Metric Tons) 
Nitrogen Fertilizer Sales" 
Period 
(1973) 
Projected 
(1973) 
Actual 
(1973) 
Actual 1972-73 
(1973) 
Closing 
Stocks 
(1973) 
July 24,200 19,527 17,746 16,528 
August 36,600 16,682 16,428 17,272 
September 23,600 9,085 23,620 23,832 
October 35,400 3,787 18,982 47,833 
November 
December 
59,000 
47,200 
17,760 
23,324 
Source: Official statistics, "Monthly Sales and Stock Report of Fertilizer for the Month 
of October 1973" (PASCO), November 17, 1973. 
"Measured as movement into retailers' hands. 
There was clearly a sharp drop in sales through October and a cor-
responding increase in closing stocks. 
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It is too early to say whether anything has been gained from provin-
cialization, and it would take detailed farm level study to be sure. But 
it appears that a corollary programme—the increased availability of 
Government credit—is working out. Each of the provincialized sales 
units has an ADB representative present and credit is available. This 
could have been done with the previous system but would have been more 
difficult because of the greater numbers of outlets. 
On balance, the wisdom of the decision for widespread provincializa-
tion in the Punjab is uncertain. The timing of the decision, namely, the 
middle of the rabi season, was unfortunate. 
Sind 
The problems experienced in Sind are relatively mild and of a different 
nature as compared to those in the Punjab. The Sind Agricultural Supply 
Corporation (SASCO) mentioned difficulties centering around lack of 
essential supplies such as transport, diesel fuel, and godown facilities. 
The introduction of the fertilizer card system with a view to providing 
equal benefit to each farmer proportionate to his land holdings and 
cropwise per acre requirement and anticipated supply position of fertilizer 
was appreciated by SASCO. However, the probability of malpractices 
in the implementation of the anticipated fertilizer card system could not 
be ruled out. This may create problems for the farmers with respect to 
inadequate availability of fertilizers, encouragement of black marketing, 
corruption, and hindered promotional services. 
Fertilizers Pakistan Ltd. faced some difficulties regarding the adjust-
ment of their sales points following provincialization in the Punjab. 
About 86 % of the total production now has to be distributed in Sind 
while, previously, only 60 % of their total production went to Sind and the 
remaining 40% was distributed in the Punjab. Some transportation diffi-
culties are experienced in serving their territory; and an imminent 54 % 
increase in the freight rate was a special cause for concern. The increase 
in the freight rate is likely to increase further due to increase in oil prices 
as announced by the Government of Pakistan on November 22, 1973. 
31 
North-West Frontier Province 
One of the major problems in the NWFP seems to be black-marketing 
of certain types of fertilizer. This arises, according to our interviews, 
from the following three basic reasons. 
The demand for non-urea types of fertilizers, especially SSP, is much 
greater than that for urea. Thus, some of these types are sold at higher 
than official prices and may even be "imported" at extra cost from the 
Punjab. Recent black-market prices have run three to five rupees above 
the official price of ammonium sulphate and ammonium nitrate (Rs. 25) 
and six to seven rupees above the official price of single superphosphate 
(Rs. 15). Urea was, in turn, "exported" to the Punjab this year. 
There is some smuggling to Afghanistan when there is an abundance 
of urea. This was not a problem this year. 
There are uncertainties in transportation. Railroad wagons are not 
always available, and truck transport is expensive. 
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Chapter II 
THE PRICING OF TRACTORS 
Introduction 
In November 1973, there were approximately 25,000 tractors in 
Pakistan. Most of these were in the range of 45 to 55 H.P. and the most 
popular among these were Massey-Ferguson, a British make, and Byelarus, 
a Russian product. 
The increasing use of tractors in Pakistan has been criticised as a 
labour-displacing factor in an economy with surplus labour. However, 
there is a definite economic advantage in their use. Tractor power 
improves the quality and speed of agricultural operations. In addition, 
the use of tractors frees land formerly used to raise feed for the bullocks. 
The labour displacement problem, such as it is, needs more investigation 
by comprehensive field surveys before any definite conclusions can be 
drawn. 
Though there are plans for manufacturing tractors within Pakistan 
by the Pakistan Tractors Corporation, tractors so far have been imported 
under tied loans and barter. The tied imports are financed by the 
International Development Association (IDA), an affiliate of the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD/World Bank). 
According to the requirements of the IDA 'tractor loans' to the Govern-
ment of Pakistan, tractor procurement is 'tied' to member countries of 
the World Bank/IDA. Imports of 'barter' tractors are tied to the 
countries with which Pakistan has negotiated such barter agreement, e.g., 
Russia, Yugoslavia and Poland. The United Kingdom, the United 
States, and Yugoslavia are the World Bank members from whom Pakistan 
has been importing tractors financed by the IDA. Total tractor imports 
by the type of programme and year are shown in Tables 11 and 12. 
Structure of the Industry 
The demand for tractors at the fixed selling price exceeds the existing 
supply in Pakistan. In the imports and distribution of tractors within 
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Table 11 
Number of Tractors Imported in Pakistan, 1965-66 to 1972-73 
Make of the IDA Loan Imports Other Imports 
Tractor ADBP Financed Total 
ADBP Financed Cash Payment 
M.F. 6,054 — 324 6,378 
Ford 3,485 — 557 4,042 
I.H. 2,175 — 187 2,362 
Byelarus — 1,994 6,865 8,859 
J. Deere 749 103 N.A. 852 
Deutz 237 783 170 1,190 
Zudrugar 98 — — 98 
IMT 137 102 462 701 
Fiat — 568 1,912 2,480 
Zetor — 154 384 538 
Hnlrlfir 15 N.A. 15 
Total 12,935 3,719 10,861 27,515 
Source: Data, except those for Ford which were obtained from the distributor, are 
derived from the ADBP data. 
Table 12 
ADBP Financed Imports of Tractors in Pakistan, 1965 to 1972-73 
Tractor Imported Financed by Total No. of 
Period : Tractors 
IDA Non-IDA 
1965-66 925 1 926 
1966-67 2,471 30 2,501 
1967-68 1,500 532 2,032 
1968-69 1,590 551 2,141 
1969-70 1,934 543 2,477 
1970-71 2,441 455 2,896 
1971-72 1,521 385 1,906 
1972-73 1,375 304 1,679 
Total 13,757 2,801 16,558 
Source: ADBP 
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the country, a central role has been played by the Agricultural Develop-
ment Bank of Pakistan (ADBP). 
Sole of the ADBP 
An agreement between the IDA and the Government of Pakistan 
stipulated that each person importing a tractor financed by the IDA loan 
must apply to the ADBP. The minimum requirements include owner-
ship of at least 25 acres of farm land and plans to use the tractor on at 
least 75 acres. Approved applications are added to a waiting list for the 
type of the IDA-financed tractor desired. 
When the IDA funds are available, the ADBP fixes the number of 
tractors of each brand to be imported. The licenses eventually issued for 
the different types of tractors are according to the preferences indicated 
by the approved applicants. Ford, Massey-Ferguson, International Har-
vestor, Fiat, and IMT have been imported under the IDA credit. Since 
Yugoslavia, an IDA member, also has a barter agreement with Pakistan, 
IMT, a Yugoslav product, is the only tractor imported under both the 
IDA and barter arrangements. 
Pakistani imports agents of the tractor companies are then notified 
and asked to negotiate a price with their foreign suppliers. These prices 
and the costs that the importer anticipates to incur in distributing the 
tractors within Pakistan must be approved by the ADBP. In turn, the 
ADBP recommends a C&F price (Karachi) for approval to the Ministry 
of Industries' Controller-General of prices. 
Agents for three major suppliers of tractors to Pakistan have claimed 
that these negotiated prices were significantly below the prices obtaining 
in the country of manufacture. These "discounts" have reportedly been 
as high as 30% but more recently they have been about 20% to 25%. 
With the approval of the Ministry of Industries, the IDA makes 
payment both to the exporter for the approved FOB price and for the 
ocean freight. The Ministry of Industries' Supply and Price Wing also 
determines the price at which the tractors will be sold to farmers on the 
basis of the approved C&F price, the official rate of exchange, and the 
internal costs documented by importers and approved by the ADBP. 
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The ADBP supplies a list of approved applications to importers for 
the delivery of tractors. Farmers must obtain loans from the ADBP 
regardless of their financial condition. The typical terms are 20% 
cash and 8% interest with ten annual equal payments of principal and 
interest. The loans are secured by "immovable property" such as land 
for at least one-half of the loan with, the remainder under such security as 
bank guarantees and fixed deposits including those with the ADBP. 
The loan may not be repaid in full before the expiry of two years. Some 
farmers with sufficient cash deposits earn an interest of 6.5 percent per 
annum against an interest of 8 % on the tractor loan. 
Prior to December 1973, the ADBP had received several loans from 
Government and the State Bank of Pakistan. The ADBP borrows at 
six percent, and lends at eight percent per annum. However, since the 
bank rate was raised from six to eight percent, interest payable by the 
ADBP might rise from six to eight percent. The interest rate payable 
by the borrower might also be raised by two points. 
Home Deliyery System 
Although the Home Delivery System has been in operation for a 
number of years, only a limited number of tractors were imported under 
it. The scheme permits a Pakistani living abroad to send a tractor to a 
friend in Pakistan, provided the former's earnings are proved not to have 
originated from salary or other remittances from Pakistan. However, 
the rules in this regard are rather vague and the scheme has been of little 
use. 
Barter 
When the Government negotiates barter agreements with foreign 
Governments, such as the Government of Yugoslavia, import agents, say 
of tractors, indicate to the Government their desire to utilize the prospective 
barter, specifying the number of tractors required. All such requests are 
processed by the Ministry of Agriculture and are passed on to the Ministry 
of Commerce which conducts the barter negotiations. Once the barter 
agreement is reached, Pakistani agents negotiate contracts directly with 
supplier firms in the barter country. The contracts specify the number of 
machines, the delivery schedule, and rupee prices. The ADBP must 
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then approve these prices. The interviews indicated that the negotiated 
barter prices were lower than those obtaining in the exporting country. 
The barter price is the basis for determining the sale price to the 
farmer. Port charges, transportation costs, and duties for barter tractors 
are similar to those for the IDA- financed tractors. The National Bank 
of Pakistan makes a book adjustment for payment to the tractor exporters 
for which reimbursement is made by the importer to the bank in Pakistan. 
Prior to September 3, 1973, there was no restriction on the distribu-
tion of barter tractors. Sales on payment could be made to farmers and 
others. Because of devastating floods in Summer 1973, tractors were, 
however, declared an essential commodity on September 3, and all 
tractors to be delivered to farmers were taken over by the Government. 
These are now being made available to public organisations involved in 
flood affected areas for reconstruction purposes and for hire by farmers 
for agricultural activities. Before the floods, imports of IMT tractors 
(from Yugoslavia) were sufficient to meet the demand at the given price. 
The Pakistan Tractors Corporation11 
The Pakistan Tractors Corporation (PTC), a semi-Government body, 
was formed on October 17, 1973. It aims at making Pakistan self-
sufficient in 40-50 H.P. tractors, in the long run. The production of 
standardised tractors will be a gradual process, beginning with assembling 
of tractors from components and parts imported in completely knocked 
down condition. 
In October 1973, the PTC invited tenders to develop tractors, imple-
ments, and tractor parts production, distribution, and service facilities 
in Pakistan. There were two main contenders—Fiat of Italy and 
Massey-Ferguson Tractor Company of the United Kingdom. An 
agreement was concluded with Massey-Ferguson and its subsidiary, Perkins 
Engine Company,11 in January 1973 which became effective in October 
1973. 
The contracts, valid for 10 years, provide for technical assistance for 
the manufacture of the 47 H.P. Model 135 tractors in Pakistan. The 
"Based on information furnished by the PTC. 
"Perkins manufactures engines for Massey-Ferguson tractors. 
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agreement encompasses production and quality control of the compo-
nents and parts manufactured in Pakistan and provides for supply of those 
components and parts to the PTC which are not manufactured in Pakistan. 
The Millat Tractor Corporation of Pakistan, a private sector firm the 
management of which has been taken over by Government, had contracts 
with M-F and its subsidiary, Perkins. These provided for technical 
assistance and supply of tractors and, in some cases, components to Millat, 
The technical assistance contract expired in 1971 and the service contract 
was allowed to lapse. 
An appraisal has been made by the Pakistan Tractors Corporation 
and Massey-Ferguson of parts that can be manufactured in Pakistan for 
the "Massey-Ferguson 135." Though some parts will be made by the 
PTC itself, it has not yet been decided as to which parts are to be imported. 
The supervision of the quality of the parts made in Pakistan is the responsi-
bility of Massey-Ferguson. 
The PTC is responsible for the contract and delivery of the parts from 
Pakistani suppliers and for imports. At present all components will be 
imported in the completely knocked down condition and the assembly 
facilities of the Millat Factories in Lahore will be utilised. As Pakistan-
made parts become available, these will gradually replace the imported 
components. 
The mix of different brands and sizes of tractors including components 
parts (partial or complete) of Massey-Ferguson tractors is determined by a 
Committee including representatives of the Ministries of Production, 
Commerce and Finance, and the Agricultural Development Bank. The 
PTC itself is not a member but assists in the work of the Committee. 
Many factors influence the determination of the mix of imports. 
For example, with the conclusion of the agreement with Massey-Ferguson 
in 1973, foreign exchange was allocated to the PTC for the purchase of the 
M-F machines. Previously, the imports of M-F 135 as well as other 
tractors had been limited to IDA credits, barter, home delivery system, 
and bilateral agreements with countries such as Germany. The mix of 
imports was influenced by the availability of barter credit, the availability 
of IDA credit, the price offers by alternative suppliers, and the ready 
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availability of tractors. The influence of these factors was brought out in 
September-October, 1973. The devastating flood accentuated the demand 
for tractors in the horse power range of the M-F 135. However, Massey-
Ferguson was not in a position to supply the requisite number of tractors 
at short notice. Therefore, negotiations were carried out not only with 
Massey-Ferguson but also with Fiat, Ford, IMT, and Byelarus for the 
delivery of tractors. 
The PTC's plans for manufacturing implements (e.g., cultivators, 
mouldboard ploughs, and disc harrows) are still in the formative stage. 
While the arrangement with Massey-Ferguson provides for assistance in 
this area, the PTC is not obliged to go ahead with implement production. 
Prices and Costs 
Tractors 
There are wide variations in the C&F prices of tractors due to 
differences in freight rates, horse power, and the makes of the tractors. 
The FOB prices for the same type and make of tractors may vary over 
consignments. 
In Table 13, we have shown the detailed cost build-up of various tractors 
by taking into account the FOB price, freight costs, port charges, customs 
duties, and preparation and other charges. 
Spare Parts 
Until recently, imports of spare parts were permitted only to tractors 
importers. They were required, however, to import spare parts equal to 
1 6 | % or ±% of the combined value of tractors, spare parts, and 
implements imported. The number and type of spare parts are required 
to reflect the expected depreciation and wear of the tractors. Spare 
parts can be freely imported now, but the 16 | % rule has been retained 
for the principals dealing with tractor imports. The result has been the 
import of fast moving parts by both the non-tractor importers and the 
principals. 
The mark-up allowed on spare parts is 30% and the commission of 
the dealer is 10%. The import duty levied on spare parts by the Govern-
ment is 50%. Previously, the duty was 10% but had to be raised to the 
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Table 13 
Tractor Cost Build-up, Pakistan, 1973 
Cost Item Tractor Makes and Specifications 
I H 4 4 4 1 IH 2 Ford 30003 M F 3 5 4 Zetor 47126 Zetor 5711" Imt 533' Byelarus Ml 
(45 h.p.) (72 h.p.) (46 h.p.) (45 h.p.) (45 h.p.) (60 h.p.) (41 h.p.) (55 h.p.) 
(UK) (W. Germ.) (UK) ( U K ) (Czech.) (Czech.) (Yug.) (USSR) 
FOB Cost £ 921.54 Dm. 14,189 £ 1,197.5 NA NA NA NA N A 
Ocean Freight £ 67.38 D m . 980 £ 104 NA NA N A NA N A 
C & F Cost £ 988.92 D m 15,169 £ 1,301.5 NA 8 3,008 S 3,342 N A N A 
Rupees equivalent Rs. 28,674 Rs. 65,959 Rs. 34,477 Rs. 39,750 Rs. 29,780 Rs. 33,086 Rs. 22,730 Rs. 23,772 
Importing Costa 
(5% of C&F) Rs. 1,435 3,300 1,725 1,988 1,489f l,654f 1,137 1,188 
Customs duty Rs. 0-b 6,662 3,621 4,173 3,183fg 3,544% 2,284 2,424 
Landed Cost Rs. 30,494 76,745 40,253 45,911 34,452 38,284 26,151 27,384 
Octroi 
(Municipal Taxes) Rs. 64 767 450 NA 344 386 NA 242 
Preparation Cost Rs. 400 400d 650 750 400 400 450 400 
Agent and Dealer 's 
Mark-up Rs. 2,367® 7,674® 3,101 4,591« 3,445 3,828 2,615 2,738 
Ex-Karachi Price Rs. 32,940 Rs. 84,762 Rs. 44,024 Rs. 51,25?h Rs. 38,641 Rs. 42,898 Rs. 29,216b Rs. 30,764 
(Ex-Lahore) 
Source: Interviews in Lahore and Karachi, November, 1973. 
Terms of Sale 
IDA-financed, delivered July, 1972. 
*" Imported under German credit. Delivered Karachi Nov. 17, 1973. Imported in semi-knocked down condition. 
8- Delivered April 1973 in semi-knocked down condition. 
*• Ordered August, 1973. Selling price has not yet been finalized by the Controller-General of Prices. 
•• Ordered and to be delivered in first half of 1974 under barter. Selling price has not yet been finalized by the Controller-
General of Prices. 
Ordered and to be delivered first half of 1974 under barter. Selling price has not yet been finalized by Controller-General 
of Prices. 
Shipment delivered to Pakistan on barter and IDA financing in Spring 1973. 
Shipment expected to be delivered in early 1974. C & F price is firm. Other costs and selling price ex-Karachi are 
proposed but not yet approved by the Controller-General of Prices. 
Footnotes 
aComposed as follows: part handling 1/2%, insurance charges 1 %, license fee 1/4%, banking and financing costs 3 %, other 
1/4%. Some of the actual figures reported for these categories differed from these reported in the table; usually they were 
higher. 
^Imported before the duty was levied. 
cResidual 
dFirm has applied to the Government of Pakistan for increase to Rs. 7.50. 
®10% of the landed cost. 
fAnticipated allowances that will be approved by the Controller-General of Prices. 
b10% of 105% of C&F. 
hPlus Octroi Tax. 
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load of the duty imposed on equivalent automobile spare parts. The 
rate of duty on non-interchangeable parts, however, remains unchanged. 
Some of the tractor importers feel that this combination of procedures is 
placing an undue burden on them. They suggested that either the 
percentage rule applicable to them be relaxed or that licenses for parts be 
given only to the tractor importers. 
Tariff classifications have caused market disruptions. Because car 
and bus parts were assessed at 50% to 60% tariff and tractors parts were 
assessed at 5% to 10%, imports of car and bus parts were declared as 
tractor parts. This led the Government to declare that for purposes of 
tariffs on parts, a tractor would be considered an automotive vehicle and 
that tractor parts (specifically tractor parts under Pakistan Tariff Classi-
fications 84.63, 84.64 and 85.08) will be subject to duty applicable to parts 
of automotive vehicles, i.e., at 50%. 
Implements 
At one time, 10% of the combined import value of barter tractors, 
implements, and parts were required to be implements. This rule is no 
longer applicable to barter imports. The IDA loan proceeds are still 
utilized in the ratio of | for tractors, £ for implements, and | for 
parts. 
The ADBP has required that a cultivator be sold with each tractor. 
Equipment prices are fixed. However, prices of cultivators in the free-
market were reported to be almost double the fixed price during the last 
part of 1973. 
Implements are imported with the approval of the ADBP. The 
Ministry of Commerce issues the import licences, which are freely given to 
those on approval lists. Suppliers of implements give discounts (relative 
to prices in the exporting country) which are somewhat lower than the 
discounts for tractors. The duty on imported implements is 10% to 20% 
and the dealer's commission is 7.5%. 
Some principals felt that prices of implements had gone up consider-
ably due to protection given by the Government to local manufacturers 
and had an adverse effect on their quality. 
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